Update Russia: Election Results are a Strategic Defeat for the Kremlin

Written by Leonid Gozman, President Union of Right Forces. The results of the election came as no surprise to anyone in Russia. No one doubted that Putin’s main party, United Russia, would not simply win, but maintain its constitutional majority. This result, as well as the cynical falsifications, the banning of any independent candidates from the electoral process, and similar actions, is nothing new. It has long been clear to opposition-minded citizens – and their number is growing – that the exercise we have been calling “elections,” compared to what happens in other countries, has nothing to do with elections. It is beneficial that increasingly more people in the West understand this. However, the way the elections were held and how they concluded allow us to draw some important conclusions about Russia’s future.

1. The Kremlin has demonstrated both a high level of technology to manipulate and rig elections and its willingness to use these techniques to achieve its desired outcome despite the domestic outrage and international perception. Public resistance to electoral fraud – observation of the vote count and voting procedures – has failed to stand up to the Kremlin, which pays no attention to either law or morality. It is clear that, to retain power, the current leaders of Russia will continue to commit any violation and falsification.

2. The Russian government has to rely on increasingly amoral and often simply inadequate people. A number of odious figures have appeared in the new Duma, such as Maria Butina, a former U.S. prisoner, Anatoly Wasserman, known for his bizarre behaviour that made many people question his mental health, and others. All of them, of course, declare their complete loyalty to Putin. At the same time, all the most scandalous members of the previous Duma have kept their seats, like Peter Tolstoy, the head of the Russian delegation to PACE, who expresses such an aggressive position that even the Russian Foreign Ministry looks peaceful in comparison.

3. Admittedly, this will only affect the rhetoric of the new Duma, but not its actions. The Russian Duma is not a parliament in the full sense of the word. In fact, the laws are passed by the presidential administration, and the Duma merely approves them. It has been deprived of political independence altogether. In the twenty years of Putin’s rule, there has not been a single instance of the Duma opposing the president, or even raising the slightest doubt as to the correctness of his position. The new Duma will be as wholly controllable as the previous one.

4. In democracies, elections serve at least two functions: to form power and to reduce social tension as a means of peacefully channelling discontent. In Russian history, elections have been a tool for shaping power only twice – shortly before the 1917 revolution, and under President Yeltsin. Today’s government does not trust citizens to form either the gubernatorial or deputy corps. They appoint everyone. In this sense, elections have long been like elections in the USSR; everyone knows in advance who will win. But the Kremlin has not succeeded in reducing public discontent either.

5. The main task of the Kremlin in this election was to strengthen its own plebiscitary legitimacy. For years, Putin and his entourage have been telling all those disgruntled that the majority voted for them, and therefore they have the right to remain in power. Now the opposition-minded segment of Russian society, which is already the majority in big cities, is convinced that United Russia lost, that the majority voted against the government, that the votes were stolen, and that the official results are nothing more than falsification. The legitimacy of the government as a result of the election has not increased, but decreased.

6. Since the authorities, in speaking to disgruntled citizens, will no longer be able to appeal to the support of the majority, the likelihood of direct suppression of any discontent increases dramatically. In fact, the regime already reverted to this practice a few months ago, but now we can no longer rule out acts such as firing into crowds.

7. The elections contributed to a decrease in the legitimacy of the authorities not only in the opposition segment of society, but also within the elites themselves. Not everyone there is happy about the prospect of an inevitable violent confrontation with their own people. Even many corrupt officials or those involved in the crimes of the regime will breathe a sigh of relief when and if there is a change at the top of our hierarchy. This further increases the likelihood of a palace coup – a likelihood that has risen sharply over the past two years because its prerequisite is that potential conspirators must be convinced that their actions will be approved by the elites.

8. High results were also needed by the Kremlin to check its readiness for 2024 – for Putin’s re-election to his sixth term. Formally, the system has confirmed its readiness to meet any challenge. But the experience of many countries, including ours, shows that in this way of forming institutions of power, as in ours, the very people who served the regime faithfully in calm times will betray it as soon as it seems profitable and safe to them. This was the case with the fall of the Russian monarchy, and so it was with the collapse of the Communist system. There is no reason to believe that this will be any different now. The last election did not increase the readiness of the system for 2024.

9. The intrigue of this election revolved around Navalny’s party, which was not registered by the authorities, but could not be destroyed. The regime’s propagandists spent a lot of time and energy “exposing” Navalny, while citizens argued not about the merits or lack thereof of the candidates, but about whether or not the “Smart Vote” (Navalny’s call to support anyone, even an heir of Joseph Stalin, who could beat United Russia’s candidate) was correct. These discussions aside, the most important result of the last few months has been an understanding that neither prisons nor forced emigration have succeeded in stopping social activism in Russia, nor have the authorities succeeded in destroying all that is still alive in Russia.

10. While fighting Navalny, the authorities have made the unforgivable mistake of not realizing that Navalny and his comrades made no secret of their intolerance toward the current government but acted by absolutely peaceful and lawful means. They did not call to build barricades, but only to vote in a certain way. Now, millions of people who had hoped for a peaceful path have become convinced that it leads nowhere. The inevitable result is a radicalization of protest (with a decrease in its number) and the strengthening of those in the protest movement supporting violent methods. This has happened many times in Russian history. The possible transition to Molotov cocktails is also one of the consequences of these elections.

11. The unprecedented level of anti-Western rhetoric during the entire election campaign is noteworthy. Discussions of foreign interference in our elections, attempts to discredit them, and so on, were among the dominant themes of official propaganda.

12. If the regime survives to the next electoral cycle, it cannot be ruled out that there will be no elections at all. (Of course, this will be presented as temporary and connected, for example, with the hostile activity of foreign states). The point is not only that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the authorities to obtain the desired results; elections are contrary to the very essence of the Russian regime. A leader who has no alternatives and is irremovable and, as Duma Speaker Volodin stated, given to Russia by God himself, cannot in principle be part of an electoral race. It is akin to electing Christ or Mohammed every few years. If this happens, our autocracy will finally have a legal form and Putin’s Russia will stop pretending to be a European country.

13. This election, despite the declared victory, is an unquestionable strategic defeat for the Kremlin – a consequence of the unprofessionalism and irresponsibility of our authorities, and their inability and unwillingness to look ahead. The leadership of our country has always been famous for victories like today’s. We defeated Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Now all our former satellites are in NATO. We invaded Afghanistan and hammered the last nail in the coffin of the USSR. We seized Crimea to the applause of our own population, strengthened the unity of Ukraine, and lost it forever instead of dividing it. We also increased the risk of war and dealt a crushing blow to our economy. But power that is not elected and not controlled by the people always makes fatal mistakes. Vladimir Putin’s power is no exception.